The province, situated on Sumatra island, has witnessed a surge in arriving boats, predominantly carrying Rohingya refugees from southern Bangladesh, where many sought refuge in 2017 following military attacks on the persecuted Muslim minority in Myanmar.

According to the Indonesian Navy, a coast guard vessel identified a boat believed to be transporting Rohingya refugees entering Indonesia’s waters on Wednesday. Subsequently, a navy ship’s helicopter located a wooden vessel nearing Weh island in north Aceh province writes the AP.

The navy ship, KRI Bontang-907, located the boat approximately 63 nautical miles (72 miles) off the Indonesian coast and escorted it out, as stated on the navy’s website: “ensuring that the boat did not return to Indonesian waters.”

Indonesia has appealed for international assistance and has intensified patrols in its waters due to a significant increase in Rohingya refugees leaving overcrowded camps in Bangladesh since November. Over 1,500 Rohingya have arrived in Aceh, facing some hostility from fellow Muslims.

In a disturbing incident on Wednesday, a group of students attacked the basement of a local community hall in Banda Aceh, the capital of Aceh province, where approximately 137 Rohingya were seeking shelter. Footage obtained by The Associated Press showed a large group of refugees, primarily women and children, being forcibly placed on the back of trucks by individuals wearing university green jackets.

This incident has drawn strong criticism from human rights groups and the U.N. refugee agency, which noted that the attack left the refugees shocked and traumatized.

It’s noteworthy that Indonesia, like Thailand and Malaysia, is not a signatory to the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention and is not obligated to accept Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh. Nevertheless, refugees in distress have received temporary accommodations thus far.

While Indonesia has historically tolerated such landings, there has been a surge in anti-Rohingya sentiment this year, particularly in Aceh, where residents accuse the Rohingya of poor behavior and creating a burden. This growing hostility has pressured President Joko Widodo’s government to take action.

Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi acknowledged the complexity of the issue, stating, “This is not an easy issue, this is an issue with enormous challenges,” in response to the rising tensions between locals and Rohingya refugees.

The Rohingya crisis, stemming from a brutal counterinsurgency campaign by Myanmar’s security forces, has resulted in approximately 740,000 Rohingya seeking refuge in Bangladesh. Efforts to repatriate them have faltered due to concerns about their safety.

The Rohingya face widespread social discrimination and are largely denied citizenship rights in Buddhist-majority Myanmar, where international courts are examining allegations of genocide and other grave human rights abuses committed by Myanmar authorities.

The post Indonesian Navy Forces Rohingya Refugee Boat Back Out first appeared on The Postcolonial.

The report, relying on public documents, satellite images, and witness testimonies, highlights that authorities are now targeting mosques in the northern Ningxia region and Gansu province, areas with significant Hui Muslim populations, as part of an officially termed “consolidation” process, writes the AP.

According to the report, this crackdown involves not only closures but also the removal of architectural elements from mosques to align them more closely with “Chinese” aesthetics. This aligns with the broader objective of the ruling Communist Party to assert control over religious practices and mitigate potential challenges to its authority.

President Xi Jinping’s 2016 call for the “Sinicization” of religions initiated a crackdown primarily focused on Xinjiang, home to over 11 million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities.

A United Nations report from the previous year suggested that China may have committed “crimes against humanity” in Xinjiang, including the construction of extrajudicial internment camps holding at least 1 million Uyghurs, Huis, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz.

Human Rights Watch asserts that Chinese authorities are decommissioning, closing, demolishing, or repurposing mosques in regions outside Xinjiang to suppress religious expression.

In response to an Associated Press request for comment, the Chinese Foreign Ministry emphasized its commitment to protecting and repairing mosques, stating that it ensures the normal religious needs of believers are met. The ministry criticized the alleged bias against China and urged organizations to refrain from using religious issues for political manipulation.

The term “mosque consolidation” first surfaced in an April 2018 internal party document, leaked as part of the “Xinjiang Papers.” The document instructed state agencies nationwide to enhance the standardized management of Islamic religious venues and discouraged the construction of new mosques to reduce their overall number.

Human Rights Watch’s acting China director, Maya Wang, asserted, “The Chinese government is not ‘consolidating’ mosques as it claims, but closing many down in violation of religious freedom.” She described the government’s actions as part of a systematic effort to curb the practice of Islam in China.

The group’s researchers detail specific instances of mosque alterations, such as the removal of domes and minarets in Liaoqiao and Chuankou villages in Ningxia between 2019 and 2021. Videos and images, corroborated with satellite imagery, documented the destruction of three mosques’ main buildings and damage to the ablution hall of another.

References to the ” consolidating mosques ” policy were also found in a March 2018 document from Yinchuan, the capital of Ningxia, which advocated for strict control over the number and scale of religious venues, encouraging mosques to adopt Chinese architectural styles.

In Gansu province, local governments have similarly detailed efforts to “consolidate” mosques, with Guanghe County reporting the cancellation of mosque registrations, closures, and improvements.

While news reports suggest that the Chinese government has faced occasional public backlash over mosque closures or alterations in various regions, the Associated Press could not independently verify the changes outlined in the Human Rights Watch report.

The post China Extends Mosque Crackdown Beyond Xinjiang, Human Rights Watch Reports first appeared on The Postcolonial.

The latest incident occurred in Aceh Utara district, Aceh province, on Thursday afternoon, where the Rohingya boat attempted to land but left after a few hours, marking the fourth such arrival in Indonesia’s northernmost province since Tuesday. Three other boats were allowed to land in a different district, reports the AP.

Residents of Ulee Madon beach in Muara Batu sub-district expressed their refusal to accept the new group, citing previous discomfort caused by Rohingya refugees in the area.

Saiful Afwadi, a traditional leader at Muara Batu sub-district, remarked on the dilemma, stating, “From a humanitarian perspective, we are concerned, but from another perspective, they are causing commotion. We provided shelter to them, but we also cannot accommodate them.”

Rahmat Karpolo, a village head, explained the reluctance, saying, “So we are worried that the same incident will happen again,” referring to past experiences where Rohingya refugees reportedly ran away from shelters.

Over 700,000 Rohingya Muslims fled Myanmar to Bangladesh refugee camps in 2017 following an army-led crackdown. Overcrowded conditions and the desire for a better life have compelled many to attempt sea journeys, with Indonesia being a common stopover.

Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement on Thursday, clarified its stance, emphasizing that Indonesia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

The statement, attributed to Lalu Muhamad Iqbal, the Ministry’s spokesperson, noted, Indonesia does not have the obligation or capacity to accommodate refugees, let alone to provide a permanent solution for the refugees.

Iqbal highlighted that the provision of temporary shelter is solely for humanitarian reasons, but the kindness has been exploited by human traffickers seeking financial gain.

“In fact, many of them were identified as victims of human trafficking,” Iqbal added.

The post 240 Rohingya Refugees Stranded as Indonesian Residents Reject Landings first appeared on The Postcolonial.

The report asserts that the ongoing evictions, which have affected approximately 10,000 families, violate both international and national law, writes the AP.

Amnesty International’s London-based organization contends that the displaced individuals have received minimal or no compensation, and the government’s primary resettlement sites suffer from insufficient infrastructure, including deficient roads, water and electricity supplies, and sanitation facilities.

Quoting the report, it emphasizes that UNESCO stands accused of neglecting U.N. guidelines and failing in its duty to intervene and uphold the human right to housing. Amnesty asserts that UNESCO should take a stand, especially as Cambodia’s government allegedly used the World Heritage designation of Angkor Wat as justification for relocating people away from the site.

In response to Amnesty’s findings, the UNESCO World Heritage Center reportedly stated that it “does not have the ability to enforce implementation of rights-based standards and policy recommendations as our role is rather focused on policy advice, capacity building and advocacy.”

The report underscores that Angkor Wat attained World Heritage status in 1992, partly due to concerns about the potential threat posed by the growth of human settlements on the site to its preservation.

However, the report argues that the designation lacked clarity regarding existing settlements, which remained largely undisturbed until last year. The motive behind the recent push for development in the area is attributed to Cambodia’s desire to boost tourism, which waned during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Montse Ferrer, interim deputy regional director for research at Amnesty, stated, “Cambodian authorities cruelly uprooted families who have lived in Angkor for several generations, forcing them to live hand to mouth at ill-prepared relocation sites. They must immediately cease forcibly evicting people and violating international human rights law.”

The report challenges Cambodian authorities’ claims that villagers are voluntarily leaving the site. Amnesty’s research, including over 100 interviews, found that “almost all… described being evicted or pressured to leave Angkor following intimidation, harassment, threats, and acts of violence from Cambodian authorities.”

Highlighting the inadequate facilities at the resettlement camps, located nearly an hour away by motorbike from Angkor, the report notes the challenges faced by residents in making a living, particularly those who previously earned income by providing goods and services to the bustling tourist trade at Angkor Wat. The new locations are reportedly ill-prepared for farming, adversely affecting those engaged in agriculture.

The report contends that Cambodia is obligated under seven major human rights treaties to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to adequate housing. Despite Amnesty’s research, Cambodian officials have reportedly dismissed the findings, accusing the organization of drawing conclusions “thousands of kilometers away from the real situation.”

Amnesty refutes these claims, citing at least 15 families interviewed who asserted that the government informed them of the need to move to preserve Angkor’s World Heritage status.

The report quotes a speech by then-Prime Minister Hun Sen from last year, stating that the site risked losing its designation unless residents moved away voluntarily, with no compensation promised for those who chose not to comply. Under Hun Sen’s authoritative rule, such statements were considered tantamount to official policy.

The post UNESCO Faces Criticism Over Cambodian Evictions Surrounding Angkor Wat World Heritage Site first appeared on The Postcolonial.

The protest, taking place approximately 1 kilometer away from the Jakarta concert venue, featured protesters carrying a banner that declared: “Reject, cancel, and disband Coldplay concerts,” branding the band as an LGBTQ+ “propagandist” accused of undermining “faith and morals.”

The protest group had previously organized demonstrations at various locations in Jakarta, including the British Embassy, reflecting a rising trend of a small extremist fringe becoming more vocal in Indonesia despite its secular and historically tolerant society.

Coldplay, known for integrating its values into performances, notably advocating for environmental sustainability, has faced opposition due to lead singer Chris Martin’s public embrace of LGBTQ+ symbols, including wearing rainbow colors and waving gay pride flags during shows.

The backdrop for these protests includes earlier concert cancellations in Southeast Asia linked to LGBTQ+-related issues.

In July, British pop rock band The 1975 canceled performances in Jakarta and Taipei after the Malaysian government cut short a music festival due to the lead singer’s criticism of the country’s anti-gay laws and a same-sex kiss on stage.

Similarly, Lady Gaga canceled a sold-out show in Indonesia in 2012 due to security concerns following threats of violence from Muslim hard-liners opposed to her “Born This Way Ball” concert.

The Asian segment of Coldplay’s “Music Of The Spheres World Tour” features the Jakarta concert at Gelora Bung Karno stadium, with over 70,000 tickets sold within two hours of sales opening in May.

Jakarta stands out as one of the band’s key streaming hubs, boasting 1.6 million fans in the city.

The post Indonesian Muslim Conservatives Protest Coldplay Concert Over LGBTQ+ Support first appeared on The Postcolonial.

The Philippines has voiced its protests against what it considers increasingly dangerous actions by China’s coast guard and navy in recent months. On October 22, two Chinese ships blocked and separately collided with two Philippine vessels near the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.

In response to the collisions, the United States reiterated its commitment to defend the Philippines, a longstanding treaty ally, if Filipino forces came under attack in the contested waters. The Philippine government also summoned a Chinese diplomat in Manila to protest.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) diplomats expressed their concerns during the Beijing talks, part of ongoing negotiations between China and ASEAN to establish a “code of conduct” to prevent a larger armed conflict in the South China Sea.

The South China Sea has been a source of territorial disputes, with China and four ASEAN member states—Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—along with Taiwan, locked in a long-standing standoff. The region holds significant strategic importance, with potential vast undersea deposits of oil and gas.

Recent incidents in the South China Sea, such as a close encounter between a Chinese fighter jet and an American B-52 bomber, have intensified tensions between the United States and China in the region.

While the U.S. has no territorial claims, it emphasizes the importance of freedom of navigation and peaceful dispute resolution, challenging China’s expansive territorial claims in the area. China insists that the South China Sea issue is an exclusively Asian matter and has urged the U.S. not to meddle in regional affairs.

The post China and Southeast Asian Diplomats Commit to South China Sea Nonaggression Pact Amid Escalating Tensions first appeared on The Postcolonial.

The arrests took place in eight provinces starting from October 2, with 27 suspects apprehended on Friday. According to Aswin Siregar, the spokesperson for Densus 88, those arrested are believed to have links to banned extremist groups and were allegedly planning to disrupt next year’s election, writes the AP.

Indonesia, as the world’s third-largest democracy and the most populous Muslim-majority nation, is preparing for simultaneous legislative and presidential elections on February 14. The country has a history of conducting free and largely peaceful elections since the downfall of dictator Suharto in 1998.

Siregar revealed that the arrested individuals conveyed to investigators during interrogations their intent to “attack security forces to thwart or disrupt next year’s election.” He emphasized that they aimed to establish a caliphate under Sharia law in a secular nation, which goes against the principles of democracy and elections.

During the operations, the police seized various weapons and equipment, including an assault rifle, magazines, ammunition rounds, a pistol, airsoft guns, and blades used in the group’s military-style training.

Among the arrested suspects, 19 are suspected to be members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an al-Qaida-linked group known for past attacks, such as the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people, mostly foreign tourists.

Approximately 40 others are believed to have connections with a homegrown militant outfit affiliated with the Islamic State, referred to as Jemaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD). Some of the individuals admitted to being part of an unstructured extremist cell.

JI was banned by an Indonesian court in 2008 and has faced significant weakening due to ongoing crackdowns on militants by the country’s counterterrorism police, with support from the United States and Australia.

JAD was banned by an Indonesian court in 2018 and listed as a terrorist group by the United States in 2017.

JAD was responsible for several deadly suicide bombings in Indonesia, including a series of suicide attacks in 2018 in Surabaya, the country’s second-largest city, where two families, including 9- and 12-year-old girls, carried out bombings at churches and a police station, resulting in 13 deaths.

Indonesia has been combating militancy since the 2002 Bali bombings carried out by JI. In recent times, attacks by militants targeting foreigners have been replaced by smaller, less lethal incidents, often directed at government institutions, police, anti-terrorism forces, and individuals considered infidels, inspired by Islamic State group attacks abroad.

The post Indonesian police arrest 59 suspects over alleged plot to disrupt 2024 elections first appeared on The Postcolonial.

A Burmese hip-hop artist, aged 38, has been found guilty of criticizing Myanmar’s military-controlled government and has been handed a 20-year prison sentence, as confirmed by a family member on Thursday, reports the AP.

The sentence, issued on Wednesday, was given to Byu Har, also known as Min Oat Myanmar, and stands out as one of the most stringent penalties assigned to any detained celebrities who’ve spoken out against the military rulers that assumed power from the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021.

Byu Har was apprehended on May 24 at his residence in Yangon, shortly after criticizing Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of the military government, and the electric power minister. In a livestream broadcast on his Facebook page, he accused them of inadequate electricity supply to Yangon, the largest city in Myanmar.

During the livestream, he labeled Min Aung Hlaing as “incompetent”. He referred to the electricity minister as a “fool,” noting that the electricity supply had been more reliable during Suu Kyi’s administration.

Five days following his arrest, state-run media declared that he had been taken into custody due to incitement and propaganda that could disrupt state stability.

In Myanmar, also recognized as Burma, prolonged power cuts have significantly burdened the populace. Between March and early June, daily power outages were escalated to eight hours a day in Yangon to conserve energy, a measure that has since been scaled back to four hours daily.

A family member of Byu Har, speaking on condition of anonymity due to apprehensions of personal arrest, confirmed to The Associated Press on Thursday that she received news about his verdict from Insein Prison, a notorious detention facility in the country.

The charges against him included incitement, allegedly inducing fear, disseminating false information, or provoking against a government employee. Additionally, he faced charges under the state’s treason statute, although the specific conviction details remained unclear.

Local media also reported on the verdict.

As per the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, an advocacy organization monitoring arrests in Myanmar, approximately 4,000 individuals have been killed and 24,410 arrested since the military coup.

Celebrities have been particularly singled out for supporting protest movements or expressing solidarity with civilians who lost their lives due to the military’s actions.

The post Criticizing Military Leaders Cost Burmese Rapper 20-years Prison first appeared on The Postcolonial.

Parliament is set to ratify the nation’s 30th prime minister on Tuesday, following a three-month stalemate since the May elections. Chonlanan Srikaew, leader of Pheu Thai, revealed that the coalition partners had agreed to propose real estate magnate Srettha Thavisin as the forthcoming leader, writes the AP.

Despite placing second in the national election, Pheu Thai was handed an opportunity to create a government after the conservative unelected Senate repeatedly obstructed the surprise victor, the progressive Move Forward Party. Both chambers of Parliament collectively cast votes for the prime minister, under the constitution established during military rule, designed to safeguard the conservative military-backed governance.

Numerous Senate members, appointed by the Prayuth-led military administration, opposed Move Forward’s Pita Limjaroenrat as a prime ministerial candidate due to his party’s advocacy for reform of a law that criminalizes criticism of Thailand’s royal family. Critics contend that this law, which carries a maximum imprisonment term of 15 years, has been misused for political gain. Aligned with the military, Senators view themselves as protectors of traditional royalist values.

Consequently, Pheu Thai excluded Move Forward from its coalition, asserting that the party’s call for reforming the royal defamation law rendered it unfeasible to gather sufficient backing from other parties and the Senate for the approval of a new prime minister.

With 314 seats in the 500-member House of Representatives, the Pheu Thai-led coalition requires some support from the Senate to secure a majority in the combined parliamentary vote.

The Move Forward Party has asserted its refusal to back any prime ministerial nominee from a coalition that includes factions from the outgoing military-backed government.

On Monday, Pheu Thai unveiled its coalition, encompassing two military-affiliated parties — Palang Pracharath with 40 seats and United Thai Nation with 36 seats. Both maintain connections to Prayuth, who has maintained his grip on power since leading a military coup in 2014.

Pheu Thai, linked to ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a billionaire populist ousted by a 2006 military coup, joins a series of parties associated with him. The coup triggered years of upheaval, polarizing a predominantly impoverished rural majority in the north supporting Thaksin against royalists, the military, and urban supporters.

Critics have lambasted Pheu Thai for deviating from its pre-election commitment to avoid collaboration with pro-military factions.

Thaksin and his daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra announced his plan to return to Thailand on Tuesday, ahead of Parliament’s vote, marking an end to his self-imposed exile to evade politically charged prison sentences.

Paetongtarn, a pivotal Pheu Thai figure, extended apologies on Sunday to those dismayed by the party’s decision to align with pro-military parties. She attributed the move to the necessity of lacking an overwhelming victory in the May polls.

Chonlanan, Pheu Thai’s leader, affirmed on Monday that the decision was reached due to the party and its coalition partners recognizing the urgent need to address the country’s challenges, including economic improvement and ending political divisions.

“Although there are parties from the outgoing government in the coalition, all parties will work with Pheu Thai with efficiency and serve the best interests of the public,” he said according to the AP. “The coalition parties will use this chance as a beginning to build love, harmony and reconciliation of the people in the country, and will work together to create prosperity for the country and the people into the future.”

He disclosed that the coalition had agreed to back Pheu Thai’s objectives of bolstering the economy, raising the minimum wage, discontinuing mandatory conscription, supporting the ongoing legalization of medical marijuana, and pursuing constitutional amendments for a “more democratic” nation while leaving the royal defamation law untouched.

The post Thailand’s new government to include pro-military parties first appeared on The Postcolonial.

Tasi Mane refers to a long-term petroleum project on the south coast area. It is estimated to be done by 2030 with an $18 billion budget for building infrastructures such as airports, petroleum cities, supply base areas, and industrial estates. Meanwhile, the SSMEZ is located in Oecusse, an enclave area within Indonesia. From 2013-2017 alone, this project spent half a billion dollars on improving public sectors.

Both megaprojects, consecutively, are controlled by former President of East Timur, Xanana Gusmão and former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. Their involvement, characterizes by centralism and clientelism, is often criticized by many scholars.

Development becomes a political transaction tool. It shows how power can operate within their inner circle. This practice of political corruption is not something new. Even with little media exposure, corruption is part of continuity, a colonial legacy from previous colonial regimes, Portugal and Indonesia.

Mimicking colonial roots

Adérito de Jesus Soares, a local anti-corruption activist, stated that colonial regimes have continuously influenced contemporary corruption practices. Under Portuguese colonialization, political corruption emerged in the 17th century when the colonial government enforced a collective tax called “finta.”

There was a patron-client relationship between the Portuguese tax collector and the local elites. The latter has appeared to manipulate their power into bribery and smuggling. This also influenced the practice of political corruption in the post-colonial period.

Supported by political institutions that are still relatively weak, patron-client relations become some kind of norm on how elites put their inner circle into politics and business nexus.

Meanwhile, Indonesia’s colonial legacy certainly has more impact on local corruption. Under the former President of Indonesia Suharto, rent-seeking appeared dominant, thanks to military and business officials controlling most of Timor-Leste’s strategic sectors.

Companies like PT Denok Hernandez International monopolized the export of coffee, the then most crucial commodity. The practice of rent-seeking became more rampant when the Indonesian government appointed veterans to become “Pimpro” (project leaders). Infrastructure development projects such as highways were not only led by veterans, but their main objective was simply to facilitate military mobilization. Again, this kind of practice has influenced the way contemporary Timor Leste manages resources and carries out development activities. For example, criticism arose when megaprojects became another contentious arena for Gusmão and Alkatiri.

Unsettled corruption in the unsettled institution

Gusmão’s centrality and prominent name in domestic politics gave him the opportunity to place his interests in the Tasi Mane project. Gusmão’s political style relies on mere-legal mechanisms, often informal networks within his small political circles. Also, projects like Tasi Mane often received public backlash because he did not involve state institutions.

Both can be seen from how the Tasi Mane project is carried out through single-source procurement, a mechanism without a tender in selecting a partnership. This shows that political corruption allows political and business elites to cooperate, especially when there are interests that require ignoring or manipulating formal regulations.

Noting from an article from 2017 by the late political science scholar Dr. James Scambary, this project’s minimum legal basis and financial ambiguity could bankrupt the country.

Like his rival Gusmão, Alkatiri benefited from government spending through the SSMEZ project. As an influential figure in Oecusse, the SSMEZ project might be another way for him to gain more power and capital.

According to The Sydney Morning Herald, Alkatiri’s family “has extensive business interest, including in construction.” His power in Oecusse could open leeway to any kind of adjustment benefiting his circles.

Alkatiri himself has become the subject of accusations as he was involved in the ConocoPhillips bribery scandal several years ago. Knowing that domestic politics are domineering by former resistance figures, the act of corruption is often dimmed by their Nobel-worthy merit.

This is very concerning for anti-corruption commitment in Timor-Leste, mainly when former resistance figures use their power in contemporary politics to shut down criticism. Last year, a local journalist had to deal with legal charges after exposing a corruption scandal that involved a local statesman.

More media exposure is needed to increase people’s awareness of corruption. The cycles of corruption that are deeply rooted in colonialization need to be eradicated. Along with more media exposure, Timorese people deserve a solid anti-corruption watchdog to guarantee transparency and accountability in the country.

Gembong Hanung is a teaching assistant in the Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia.

This is an opinion piece. These columns are based on the author’s own opinion and are often backed by multiple sources. The Postcolonial does not necessarily agree with or share the view of every published piece in this section. You are also invited to share your opinion related to a postcolonial topic by reading our guidelines and pitching us by clicking here.

The post Postcolonial corruption in Timor-Leste first appeared on The Postcolonial.