In early January 2022, inhabitants of the Zhanaozen region in the southeastern part of Kazakhstan started protesting against the sharp rise in fuel prices. As the government removed the price cap, it doubled from $0.14 to $0.28 reported OpenDemocracy.

Despite media focus on this increase, the upsurge was rather the last drop in a very long historical process of lowering quality of life and increasing worker exploitation. 

In a matter of days, the uprising spread to central parts of the country and Kazakhstan’s capital, encompassing more social groups who joined in solidarity and started demanding more profound structural changes, such as increases in the living wages, collective bargaining recognition, improvement of worker conditions, as well as lowering pension age.

As the movement gained momentum, it quickly became politicized with new stakeholders trying to stir it in new directions. 

New Times

The Zhanaozen region has a long history of organizing with working class people being stripped of most of their rights, while the oligarch class together with foreign investors kept accumulating more and more wealth from oil exports. Some analysts call what happened in Kazakhstan a class war.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, peripheral countries like Kazakhstan incorporated very well in a neo-liberal economic order as suppliers of raw materials. The quick gains from the oil and gas industry were successfully siphoned to the ruling class, namely former president Nazarbayev’s family, as well as foreign investors.

The living conditions for the average citizen in the meantime deteriorated significantly. 

Rising conspiracy

In 2019, Nazarbayev chose his successor, the current president Tokayev, and named himself Elbasy or the ‘leader of the nation’ while keeping control over essential state institutions.

Since in power, Tokayev attempted to create a more manageable civil society, but the escalation of the crowd’s anger into more violent demonstrations motivated him to change his rhetoric.

The handful of looting incidents during these riots were the perfect opportunity for the president to call the uprising an orchestrated attack with a group of ‘terrorists’ and ‘foreign agents’ aiming to undermine the country’s sovereignty.

The conspiracy about the West organizing the protest simply can’t hold because it was Western corporations who were hit because of the strike. As an example, American oil company Chevron controls 50% of Kazakhstan’s largest oil venture in Tengiz with investment plans amounting to $50 billion. 

International geo-play

President Tokayev appealed to members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance between Russia and five other countries including Kazakhstan, to send in external military help to suppress the uprising. Overnight, the first military planes flew in to deploy Russian troops to protect main state assets, like the Airport in Nur-Sultan (formerly called Almaty).

The foreign press was quick to raise panic and call the event a Russian invasion. Local observers and analysts point to the fact that the US used the events in Kazakhstan as an offensive play on a totally different chess board, the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

In reality, Russia’s involvement was merely a geo-political gesture of authoritarian solidarity to show president Tokayev he can rely on his neighbors.

As the waters cooled down, Tokayev was quick to reassure the foreign partners that peace was restored and their money was safe in Kazakhstan.  

Looking at the events post-factum, Aljazeera reporters conclude that Russia consolidated its influence and secured the loyalty of the Kazakh leadership. Local elites and foreign investors can resume their extractive activities.

Only the people of Kazakhstan have been defeated, but if history teaches us anything, power doesn’t stay in the same hands forever. 

The post Kazakh protest spilled over into political demands first appeared on The Postcolonial.

In 2013 alone, China has invested $15 billion dollars in energy deals, which all take part in the Belt and Road Initiative, attempting to recreate the old Silk Roads. Similar to the economic networks developed by the Europeans prior to colonization, China is heavily engaged in building infrastructure and trade networks that would ease its economic activities in the region. 

Many scholars agree that the Asian giant does not have grand geo-political ambitions to be a world hegemon. China’s main interests involve a lot of natural resources coming in and a lot of trade going out, according to a 2013 study published by the organisation Saferworld. 

Central Asia has vast reserves of oil and gas that are paramount for China’s growing energy demands of 1.4 billion people and energy intensive industries. At the same time, the region  bordering the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) serves as a market for Chinese products and as a buffer zone separating China from Iran and Afghanistan. 

Colonial parallel to British India

China’s activities in Central Asia are comparable with the British economic model implemented in India during colonization.

The British Raj, the period of direct British rule over the Indian subcontinent lasted from 1858 till the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947. 

But long before the British overtook the political administration of the region, the East India Company already had a monopoly over trade and economic activity. 

And even long before the establishment of the East India Company, European trading companies transformed local economies and social organization of the labour force, integrating them into dense networks of global trade. 

For instance, Indian textile producers were also farmers. This was possible because demand for manufactured textiles was sporadic. But, when European demand for textiles increased, the Indian labour force transitioned to full time manufacturing work to fulfil the West’s needs. 

Similarly, the Dutch started trade in Indonesia in the 1600s and assumed full political control in the 19th century. And the French conducted commerce with Vietnam and Cambodia long before it colonized Indochina. The foundation of empires is undoubtedly commerce and economic transformation.

Colonialism is yesterday

It’s unlikely that colonialism will get a comeback in world history. However, drawing parallels to the present day economic activities of China, we can identify the same economic patterns that led to eventual political domination of the Indian subcontinent by the British a few centuries ago. 

Kwame Nkrumah, a Ghanian politician and political theorist, says we are living in an ‘era of neo-colonialism‘. It’s the last stage of imperialism, where the State acts somehow independent and has all the outward accessories of international sovereignty. But in practice, its economic system and political policy is directed from outside. 

China presents itself as an international partner, who respects other countries’ sovereignty and only engages in mutually beneficial “strategic” partnerships, unlike the West that imposes conditionalities on its financing.

And many scholars agree that China has a different approach. China does not demand human rights improvements, economic liberalization, nor environmental protections. The Asian giant has more tangible requirements tied to its own capital inflows. 

For instance, concessional loans for infrastructure stipulate that 50% of companies, technology, and materials used ought to be Chinese. China also prefers loan-for-resources schemes to get repayments for its loans in the form of natural resources. 

True independence seems vague if one country is heavily dependent on another country’s loans, infrastructure projects and investments. 

More vulnerable republics, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are already heavily dependent on Chinese capital flows. 

Out of Kyrgyzstan’s $3.7 billion external debt, $1.7 billion is loaned by China. 

These soft loans, provided by the Chinese government, are similar to commercial lending backed by collateral that usually takes the form of export proceeds of raw materials and agricultural products, the right to exploit mineral deposits, or having a share in state-owned enterprises. 

In the case of Tajikistan, the “cheap loans” are granted on concessional terms for 20 years and are returned as mineral deposits on more favourable terms.

Same colonial procedure

The case of Central Asia shows that one does not need to control policy in order to guide local economies, and thus development courses. More than that, most of these foreign investments end up repatriated, making the receiving countries dependent on constant external capital flows. 

Similar to the European powers a few centuries ago, China engages in massive economic projects and trade networks to profit its own economic ambitions. 

As Kwame Nkrumah reckoned, colonial control does not need to be exercised through garrisoning a territory or controlling a government. However, it is very likely that once the political climate does not favour these economic goals, China will change its current neutral position with regards to policy and sovereignty. And so the question is not what if?, but rather when?. 

The post China’s colonial economy first appeared on The Postcolonial.